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The Federal Election Commission, The
First Amendment, and Due Process*
The Federal Election Commission (FEC), established in 1974, is
responsible for civil enforcement of the federal campaign finance laws.
After the Supreme Court declared much of the 1974 legislation un-
constitutional in 1976,1 Congress passed new legislation reestablishing
the FEC, although altering its riiethod of appointment and its en-
forcement procedures.2 Further statutory changes, both substantive and
procedural, were adopted in 1979.a
From its inception, the FEC received severe criticism for its enforce-
ment procedures. 4 The 1976 campaign finance legislation failed to
provide sufficient procedural safeguards for respondents. Thus, in cases
with complex and disputed issues of fact or law, the procedures operated
arbitrarily and unfairly, burdening political activity protected by the
First Amendment.
This Note argues that, despite the recent statutory changes, the FEC's
enforcement procedures still threaten serious unfairness and excessive
expense to respondents.5 Thus, the Note contends, these procedures
* This Note relies heavily on the author's interviews with present and former FEC
commissioners, attorneys, and staff, counsel to respondents in enforcement cases, spokes-
men for political and party committees, and congressional committee personnel. Some
of these sources requested confidentiality because of their current positions or continued
dealings with the FEC. The Note also relies on 35 responses to questionnaires sent by the
author to signers of conciliation agreements and their counsel and on the author's review
of enforcement files in closed FEC cases, available in the Public Records Office of the
FEC in Washington, D.C. Cited materials are on file with the Yale Law Journal.
1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court found that congressional selection
of four of the six voting FEC members violated art. 2, § 2 of the Constitution. Id. at
120-41. It also struck down statutory limits on campaign expenditures by candidates and
independent expenditures by individuals on behalf of candidates. Id. at 39-59.
2. 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455; 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (1976).
3. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat.
1339 (1980) (codified at 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 431-441 (West Supp. 1980)).
4. See 125 CoNG. REC. S11,212-15 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey);
Bolton, Government Astride the Political Process, REGULATION, July/August 1978, at 46,
50-51; Moore, The Case of an Independent Political Action Committee, in PARTIES, IN-
TEREsT GROUPS, AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAws 56 (M. Malbin ed. 1980); Federal Election
Campaign Act Amendments, 1979: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Rules & Ad-
ministration, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 159-61 (1979) (statement of Mary Meehan) [hereinafter
cited as Hearings on 1979 Amendments].
5. The amendments have not provided an adequate remedy for the procedural short-
comings of the 1976 statute. Wadlow, Election Law Reform Fails to Silence Critics, Legal
Times of Washington, Dec. 3, 1979, at 5, col. 1; letter from Paul D. Kamenar, practicing
attorney, Feb. 3, 1980; interview with John Bolton, practicing attorney, in New Haven,
Ct. (Oct. 23, 1979).
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violate the two principles of "First Amendment due process"0 : promo-
tion of accurate determinations and avoidance of unnecessary defense
costs. After analyzing the FEC's previous enforcement procedures and
the recent amendments in light of the First Amendment's procedural re-
quirements, the Note proposes changes to create a constitutionally
adequate enforcement procedure.
I. The Federal Election Commission and Its Hybrid Enforcement
Procedure
The FEC is an independent agency within the executive branch,
headed by six appointed commissioners, 7 with exclusive jurisdiction
over civil enforcement of the federal election campaign finance laws.8
It enforces rules concerning reporting and record-keeping," campaign
contribution limits,10 corporate and union political activities," and
public financing of presidential campaigns.' 2 FEC enforcement deci-
sions have become the predominant interpretive guide' 3 to the some-
6. See generally Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REv. 518
(1970).
7. Commissioners arc appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate, for six-year terms. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(a)(1) (Vest Supp. 1980).
8. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437c(b)(1) (West Supp. 1980). A complainant must seek redress through
the FEC and, if the FEC refuses to act, must follow specific review procedures in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(8) (West
Supp. 1980); see In re Federal Election Campaign Act Litigation, FED. ELECTION CANIPAIGN
FINANCING GUIDE (CCH) 9088 (D.D.C. June 14, 1979) (construing substantially similar
provision of 1976 Act, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(9) (1976)).
9. 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 432(a)-(i), 433, 434 (West Supp. 1980).
10. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a) (1976).
11. Id. §§ 441b-441c (1976).
12. 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012, 9031-9042 (1976).
13. Although Congress established a procedure for seeking advisory opinions from
the FEC on the legality of specific, intended courses of action, 2 U.S.C. § 437f (1976), as
amended, 2 U.S.C.A. § 437f (West Supp. 1980), observers agree that the more difficult
interpretive questions are generally now being decided through enforcement actions rather
than through prospective rulings. Moore, supra note 4, at 60; interviews with: Thomas
Harris, member, Federal Election Commission, in Washington, D.C. (May 22, 1979);
William C. Oldaker, then General Counsel to FEC, in Washington, D.C. (May 25, 1979);
see note 77 infra (inadequacy of advisory opinion procedure).
In addition, FEC enforcement action may be a jurisdictional prerequisite for challenges
to FEC interpretations or to the constitutionality of campaign finance laws. See National
Conservative Political Action Comm. v. FEC, FED. ELECTrION CAMPAIGN FINANCING GUIDE
(CCH) 9057 (D.D.C. Apr. 28, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1543 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (at-
tempted challenge to advisory opinion and regulation); Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 460
F. Supp. 1017, 1019-21 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-2080 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (at-
tempted challenge to constitutionality of sections of campaign finance act under expedited
declaratory relief procedure rejected). Contra, Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 591
F.2d 29, 31-36 (7th Cir. 1979) (political action committee may seek expedited declaratory
relief in constitutional challenge to campaign statute).
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times unclear provisions of the law.14 Those decisions result from a
hybrid of investigative, prosecutorial, and de facto adjudicative func-
tions.
A. FEC Enforcement Procedures
Recently enacted amendments to the campaign finance laws have
modified the FEC enforcement framework established in 1976.15 The
Federal Election Campaign Act, however, continues to specify a four-
stage enforcement procedure that involves initiation of an action, in-
vestigation, efforts at conciliation, and finally, possible litigation. Ap-
proval by four of the six commissioners is required to proceed from
one stage to the next.'6
The four stages generally proceed as follows:
1) Initiation: an enforcement action may arise either from a signed,
notarized complaint by an individual or from information obtained by
the FEC from disclosure reports, audits, or other internal sources. 17
When the Commission receives a complaint from outside the agency, it
is required to notify the respondent and allow him fifteen days to
"demonstrate, in writing, to the Commission... that no action should
be taken" against him on the basis of the complaint.' If the Com-
mission then votes, upon staff recommendation, to find "reason to
believe" that a violation has occurred, it authorizes an investigation. 9
2) Investigation: notification of a "reason to believe" finding must
set forth the factual basis of the allegations; if the finding arose from
internal sources, the respondent must be sent a copy of the staff
14. Grey areas include the dividing line between "independent expenditures," which
may be unlimited in amount, and "in-kind contributions," subject to the contribution
limits imposed by 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)(l) (1976); the definition of "affiliation" between
political committees, which subjects them to a single contribution limit, id. § 441a(a)(5);
and the criteria for "expressly advocating" the election or defeat of a candidate for federal
office, which is defined as an "independent expenditure," 2 U.S.C.A. § 431(17) (West Supp.
1980) (identical to 2 U.S.C. § 431(p) (1976)), and must be fully reported, 2 U.S.C.A. § 434
(West Supp. 1980); see Clagett & Bolton, Buckley v. Valeo, Its Aftermath, and Its Pros-
pects, 29 VAND. L. Rgv. 1327, 1353-54 (1976) (discussion of vagueness and complexity of
the law).
15. See note 3 supra.
16. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(2), § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i), § 437g(a)(6)(A) (West Supp. 1980).
17. Id. § 437g(a)(l)-(2). Each new enforcement case is assigned a Matter Under Review
(MUR) number, which serves as a file reference number. This Note will cite the MUR
number when referring to material in the FEC's enforcement files.
18. Id. § 437g(a)(1); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15121 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R.
§ 111.6).
19. Id. § 437g(a)(2); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15121 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R.
§ 111.7-.10).
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report.2 0 The staff's investigation may include written questions, de-
positions, audits, and field investigations.2'1
After the investigation, the Commission decides whether to dismiss
the case or to take further action. The 1976 statute did not provide
the respondent, at this stage, with notice of the staff's contentions or
an opportunity to present arguments to the Commission. 22 Under the
1979 amendments, if the staff decides to recommend further proceed-
ings, the respondent receives a brief stating the staff's position on the
legal and factual issues of the case. The respondent is allowed fifteen
days in which to submit a reply brief for consideration by the Com-
mission before it votes whether to enter into conciliation.23
3) Conciliation: if the Commission finds "probable cause to believe"
that a violation has occurred or is about to occur,2 4 it must attempt first
"to correct or prevent such violation by informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion, and to enter into a conciliation agreement
with any person involved. ' 23 The agreement, negotiated by the staff
and then approved by the Commission, may impose a civil penalty. Its
terms are not subject to judicial scrutiny and it acts as a complete bar to
further action by the Commission against the respondent for the par-
ticular violation.2 6
4) Litigation: if the Commission and respondent fail to reach a
conciliation agreement, the Commission may vote to bring a civil action
in federal district court. It must prove its allegations in a de novo
trial.27
20. Id. § 437g(a)(2); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15121 (1980) (to be codified in II C.F.R.
§ 111.8(b), § 111.9); H.R. REP. No. 422, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 21 (1979).
21. Id. § 437g(a)(2); § 437d(a)(l)-(4); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15121-22 (1980) (to be codified
in 11 C.F.R. § 111.10-.15).
22. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(A) (1976); 11 C.F.R. § 111.6 (1977); Oldaker, The Federal Elec-
tion Commission: Enforcement Functions, in THE CORPORATION IN POLITICS 1979, at 11, 15
(Practising Law Institute Course Handbook Series No. 296, 1979).
23. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(3) (Vest Supp. 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15122 (1980) (to be
codified in 11 C.F.R. § 111.16).
24. Id. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15122 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R.
§ 111.17(a)). Under the 1976 statute, this determination was labeled "reasonable cause to
believe" that a violation had occurred or was about to occur. 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(5)(A)
(1976). This Note will refer to this vote as "decision to conciliate" or "entry into concilia-
tion."
25. Conciliation efforts must occur for a period of at least 30 and not more than 90
days. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15122 (1980) (to
be codified in 11 C.F.R. § 111.18).
26. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1980). The penalty accompanying a con-
ciliation agreement is limited to the greater of $5,000 or the amount involved in the
violation, unless the violation is "knowing and willful," in which case the limits are
doubled. Id. § 437g(a)(5)(A)-(B).
27. Id. § 437g(a)(6); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15123 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R.
§ 111.19); interviews with: Oldaker, sutnra note 13; Barbara Van Gelder, executive as-
sistant to Commissioner John McGarry and former FEC staff attorney, in Washington,
D.C. (April 23, 1979) (expressing personal rather than official views).
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B. The FEC's Misconception of Its Functions
The FEC contends that it exercises only investigative and prosecu-
torial powers, because it has no formal authority to compel a party to
enter into a conciliation agreement, admit a violation, or pay a fine.28
FEC officials have argued that the agency is analogous to a "civil grand
jury" that has power only to bring its charges to the attention of a
federal court for authoritative determination.2 If a respondent is dis-
satisfied with the Commission's position, they reason, he may refuse to
sign a conciliation agreement and have the full procedural safeguards
of a trial.30
Overemphasizing formal authority, this argument misconceives the
agency's enforcement role. The four enforcement stages in fact con-
stitute a hybrid of investigative, prosecutorial, and de facto adjudicative
functions. The FEC plays an investigative role in the initial stages and
a prosecutorial role in litigation. However, the FEC's grand jury
analogy ignores its de facto power to adjudicate-to reach final disposi-
tions of individual cases and to impose penalties without court review-
when cases are resolved without litigation.31
28. See Hearings on 1979 Anendrnents, supra note 4, at 150-51 (FEC's responses to
committee questions) (FEC has no adjudicatory powers, only investigatory authority);
FEC RECORD, March 1978, at 6, quoting FEC Memorandum of Points & Authorities in
Support of Motion to Dismiss at 15-17, in National Right to Work Comm. v. FEC, No.
78-0315 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 20, 1977) (FEC does not adjudicate, determine liability, or
impose any legal sanctions on its own); FEC's Answers to Interrogatories of Defendants
The Spotlight and Liberty Lobby at 2-3, in FEC v. The Spotlight, No. 78-1544 (D.D.C.,
filed Aug. 17, 1978) (Commission reaches no legal conclusions, does not determine liability
of any party, or determine whether statute has been violated); interviews with: Joan
Aikens, member, Federal Election Commission, in Washington, D.C. (May 22, 1979); Van
Gelder, supra note 27.
29. Interview with Oldaker, supra note 13; see interview with attorney for respondent,
by telephone (April 26, 1979) (describing FEC view).
30. Interview with Van Gelder, supra note 27; cf. FEC Memorandum of Points and
Authorities at 3, National Right to Work Comm. v. FEC, No. 78-0315 (D.D.C., filed Oct.
20, 1977) (administrative procedures merely preliminary to judicial trial).
The Act's enforcement sections are modeled after procedures of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which the FEC cites as precedent. See, e.g., FEC
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss at 6-8, FEC v. Elias, No. 78-1922 (E.D.
Pa., consent judgment filed April 18, 1979) (citing EEOC enforcement cases). The EEOC,
however, does not regulate political expression or operate under the time and publicity
pressures of the FEC. The practical opportunity for court review may therefore differ in
the two agencies' proceedings, a factor affecting due process analysis. Cf. Boddie v.
Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1971) (practical obstacles to court review may deprive
a party of due process right to hearing).
31. The Supreme Court has used the grand jury analogy for the investigative and
prosecutorial roles of administrative agencies. See Ewing v. Mytinger 9- Casselberry, Inc.,
339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950) (agency, like grand jury, need not hold hearing before taking
prosecutorial action); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642 (1950) (FTC,
like grand jury, may seek information without probable cause to suspect violation). How-
ever, the analogy is inappropriate when an agency imposes civil penalties and admissions
of violation. A grand jury cannot accept a suspect's admission of guilt and payment of
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The FEC's quasi-adjudicative role commences at the end of the
investigative stage, whenever the staff recommends entry into concilia-
tion negotiations. The proceeding then becomes adversarial: the staff's
position in favor of further enforcement stands directly opposed to the
respondent's interests, and the Commission chooses between the two
positions. 32 A dismissal at the close of the investigation is the respon-
dent's only way to avoid the expense and politically damaging publicity
resulting from a conciliation agreement or a civil lawsuit.33
Conciliation, too, has elements of adjudication. The conciliation
process is designed to avoid time-consuming litigation by resolving
cases within the agency whenever possible.3 4 Although the FEC does
not formally adjudicate, it may with respondent's consent-and without
further review by a court or other adjudicative body-levy a civil
penalty and record a formal declaration that the respondent has violated
the law. 35
Although legally voluntary, such agreements may be based upon the
illusion of consent. Even if the respondent disagrees with the Com-
mission's determination that he has violated the law, the exceptional
economic and political pressures, and the time constraints of the cam-
paign setting, may make a conciliation agreement the only realistic
a fine; a prosecutor may enter into a plea bargain but must secure the court's approval.
UNIFORM, RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 443(b); FED. R. CRIM. P. ll(c)-(e). In contrast, the
FEC, like a court, has the power to give final approval to consent-type agreements.
Moreover, the FEC lacks two characteristics that justify the grand jury's denial of addi-
tional procedural safeguards. First, the FEC does not share the grand jury's traditional
role as an instrument of justice and protector of individuals. Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956). Second, the FEC is required by law to make public the results
of its enforcement decisions and the basis therefor. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(4)(B)(ii) ('West
Supp. 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15123 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R. § 111.20).
32. Letter from Ronald D. Eastman, Washington, D.C., attorney for respondents in
several MUR's (July 3, 1979); letter from Peter Secchia, respondent in MUR 321 (June 8,
1979); interview with Jan Baran, then executive assistant to Commissioner Joan Aikens,
by telephone (April 18, 1979); cf. 125 CONG. REc. SI0,521 (daily ed. July 25, 1979) (remarks
of Sen. Laxalt) (FEC has judicial as well as executive and legislative functions).
33. Except in non-filer cases, which involve failures to file disclosure reports, generally
by marginal candidates and committees, and are handled in a separate procedure, the
Commission has a policy of bringing a civil action if conciliation is unsuccessful. It rarely
departs from this policy. The commissioners feel that dropping cases after the failure of
conciliation would damage the Commission's credibility in conciliation and reduce the
likelihood of agreements. Interviews with: Aikens, supra note 28; Harris, supra note 13;
Robert Tiernan, member, Federal Election Commission, in Washington, D.C. (May 23,
1979).
34. H.R. REP. No. 917, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1976); 122 CONG. REC. 12,199 (1976)
(remarks of Rep. Wayne Hays). The FEC shares this interpretation of the statute. Motion
of FEC to Dismiss at 6, Hampton v. FEC, FED. ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING GUIDE
(CCH) 9036 (D.D.C. April 15, 1977), aff'd, No. 77-1546 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1978).
35. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1980). For a discussion of language used
in conciliation agreements, see pp. 1213-14 infra.
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choice.30 Accepting an agreement on the FEC's terms may entail the
political burden of admitting a violation, ceasing the activities in ques-
tion, and undertaking in broad, vague terms not to engage in future
violations. On the other hand, it brings enforcement proceedings to a
close 37 and avoids the further publicity and expense of a lawsuit. The
stakes or the respondent's resources may be too small to justify litiga-
tion.38 Because of these pressures, the Commission has reached agree-
ments in most cases in which it has entered into conciliation.39
36. Of the 73 MUR's leading to conciliation agreements between May 1976 and May
1979, 21 involved genuine disputes of fact or law. Only two of these assessed fines of
S5,000 or more; another resulted in a fine between $1,000 and .55,000. In ten of the
MUR's, the agreements required no fines, but respondents continued to disagree with
the FEC on the meaning of the statute. The remainder resulted in fines ranging from
5$100 to .$1000. In purely economic terms, avoiding fines of this magnitude cannot justify
litigation. Nearly one-third of the questionnaires answered by respondents who signed
conciliation agreements indicated that the cost of litigation was the major factor in the
respondents' decision not to fight the Commission any further. E.g., MUR 321 ("My
attorney thought that we could beat them if we went higher, but we spent $12,000 in
legal fees (non-deductible-personal expense) and finally gave up."); MUR 372 ("We felt,
and still feel, that [our] position was factually and legally correct. However, by refusing
conciliation, the SEC [sic] would have been forced to initiate an enforcement action. The
cost of that litigation would have been enormous.")
Many political participants and observers emphasized the cost of litigation and its
effect on conciliation. Comment by Walter Moore, former executive assistant to Commis-
sioner Neil Staebler, at Political Finance Forum, Washington, D.C. (May 24, 1979); inter-
views with: John Bolton, attorney for respondents in several MUR's, in Washington,
D.C. (May 25, 1979); Joel Gora, ACLU, attorney for respondents in FEC litigation, by
telephone (May 9, 1979); Mary Meehan, Treasurer, Committee for a Constitutional Presi-
dency, by telephone (April 9, 1979); attorney for respondents, by telephone (April 16,
1979); labor union counsel, by telephone (April 18, 1979).
37. The General Counsel's letter notifying respondents of a "reason to believe" finding
and enclosing a proposed conciliation agreement makes clear that the Commission will
litigate if conciliation fails. After conciliation has proceeded for some time without
results, the Commission may take the formal step of voting to authorize a lawsuit in order
to put additional pressure on the respondent. Interview with Baran, supra note 32.
38. The FEC's situation is exceptional because it regulates participants in the political
process; time constraints during campaigns, the dangers of adverse publicity, and limited
resources combine to exert tremendous pressure upon respondents to conciliate, especially
if the threatened civil penalty is nominal.
The general problem of pressure to settle enforcement proceedings to avoid litigation
has been recognized in other contexts. I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE L4Wv TREATISE §§ 4.05,
4.06 (1st ed. 1958) (consent to administrative penalties is often coerced, yet agency decision
is largely unprotected by procedural safeguards and may be arbitrary); Schmeltzer &
Kitzes, Administrative Civil Penalties Are Here To Stay-But How Should They Be Imple-
mented? 26 Ams. U.L. REV. 847, 852-53, 870 (1977) ("[w]here the fine is small, the re-
spondent's constitutional rights may be sacrificed to economic practicality"; "arm twist-
ing" to arrive at quick settlement); cf. Note, Costs and the Plea Bargaining Process: Re-
ducing the Price of Justice to the Nonindigent Defendant, 89 YALE L.J. 333, 342-49 (1979)
(heavy costs of criminal defense at trial put unreasonable pressure on nonindigent de-
fendants to accept plea bargains).
39. In the nearly 500 MUR files opened after May 1976 and closed before the end of
May 1979, the Commission decided to enter into conciliation in 99 MUR's (excluding
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In practice, therefore, the FEC occupies an intermediate position
between quasi-judicial and purely executive agencies. The former are
empowered to conduct full-scale adjudication on the record, subject
to judicial review, whereas the latter must bring all enforcement cases
in federal district court.40
The FEC's intermediate, hybrid model provides appropriate pro-
cedures for two categories of enforcement cases. Conciliation works
fairly well for small cases involving clear-cut violations. 41 Without im-
posing the expenses of a full-scale adjudicative proceeding,42 it allows
the FEC to enforce the law and create incentives for compliance.4 3 Civil
prosecution in federal court, on the other hand, is appropriate for
"non-filer" cases). Conciliation agreements were reached in 73 of these MUR's, nearly
75% of the cases. Civil actions were brought by the Commission in 18 MUR's, fewer than
one-fifth of the cases that entered conciliation, and 8 other MUR's were dropped. Hence,
conciliation agreements were four times as frequent as civil litigation.
40. The National Labor Relations Board is an example of the first model, 29 U.S.C.
§ 160 (1976); administrative agencies that enforce statutes through court adjudication,
such as the Food and Drug Administration, 21 U.S.C. §§ 332-334 (1976), represent the
second. An intermediate model partly analogous to the FEC has been used in a number
of federal regulatory schemes in which the statute sets forth guidelines for the amount
of the penalty, the agency is authorized to mitigate or compromise the penalty by ac-
cepting payment of a lesser sum, but if negotiation fails, the agency must seek enforce-
ment de novo in federal district court. No procedural guidelines are established for these
internal agency determinations. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 503, 504(a)-(b) (1976) (FCC forfeitures
for illegal rebates). See generally Schmeltzer & Kitzes, supra note 38, at 851-56 (informal
agency procedures for settling civil penalties). The perceived procedural inadequacies of
this intermediate model have given rise to considerable discussion, but suggested changes
remain locked within the traditional two-model concept. See, e.g., Goldschmid, Report in
Support of Recommendation 72-6: An Evaluation of the Present and Potential Use of Civil
Money Penalties as a Sanction by Federal Administrative Agencies, in 2 RECOMMENDATIONS
AND REPORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 896, 925-32 (1972)
(recommending internal agency imposition of civil penalties after evidentiary hearings, as
efficient alternative to federal court adjudication).
41. Of 73 MUR's leading to conciliation agreements, 52 MUR's involved clear fact
situations and clear statutory provisions, most commonly corporate campaign contribu-
tions, and donations or loans in excess of the contribution limits. Thus, more than 70%
of these MUR's were appropriately handled by a simple, expeditious procedure. Cf.
Goldschmid, supra note 40, at 932 (administrative imposition of civil penalties appro-
priate when volume of cases is large and legal issues rarely arise); Developments in the
Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1109, 1200 (1971) (advantages of conciliation in employment discrimination cases).
42. Amendments proposing the application of Administrative Procedure Act require-
ments to the FEC and the establishment of hearing examiners were specifically rejected
by the Committee on House Administration as overly expensive and unnecessary. Tran-
script of markup session, Committee on House Administration, March 9, 1978, at 499-505
(unpublished, on file at Committee).
43. See Schmeltzer & Kitzes, supra note 38, at 852 (since majority of administrative
civil penalties "involve sums of less than $1,000, lengthy legal procedures to assure com-
pliance would be wasteful"); cf. Gellhorn, Administrative Prescription and Imposition of
Penalties, 1970 WASH. U.L.Q. 265, 281 (administrative imposition of penalties "'offers a
lever to secure compliance with the law which the more ponderous instrument of court
action could not afford' ").
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cases involving substantial issues of fact or law, unresolved First Amend-
ment issues, and sizable amounts in controversy-a relatively small
fraction of enforcement cases.44 Judicial proceedings are better able to
deal with extensive, complex factual disputes than is the FEC's ad-
ministrative process, 45 and courts are more likely to bring a broad
perspective to the First Amendment questions implicated in restric-
tions on political activity. 40
More than one quarter of the conciliation agreements, however, in-
volve issues that are too complex and controversial to be dealt with
fairly under the current simplified procedures, but that are unlikely to
reach court because the financial and political stakes are too small rel-
ative to the respondent's resources.4 7 If the respondent in such a case
cannot persuade the agency to dismiss its action, he will be forced to
enter into a conciliation agreement without sufficient safeguards for his
rights.
II. The FEC's Procedural Shortcomings
Four flaws in the FEC enforcement process create the likelihood of
unfairness to respondents in many cases. In each instance, FEC officials
have denied the problem of unfairness and opposed new safeguards as
too costly.
A. Insufficient Disclosure of Information to Respondents
In an adversarial proceeding, the respondent should know the basis
of the allegations against him. The FEC's proceedings become ad-
versarial when the staff recommends, at the close of investigation, that
the Commission enter into conciliation rather than dismiss the case.48
If the Commission accepts the staff's recommendation, the respondent
44. Cases of this magnitude, pending or recently decided in federal district court, in-
clude FEC v. National Educ. Ass'n, 457 F. Supp. 1102 (D.D.C. 1978), appeal docketed, No.
79-1077 (D.C. Cir. Jan. 22, 1979) (union political action committee's reverse checkoff pro-
cedure violates prohibition on coercive solicitation); FEC v. AFL-CIO, No. 77-2147 (D.D.C.,
summary judgment for plaintiff granted, June 16, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-1937
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 15, 1978) (S300,000 transfer from AFL-CIO treasury to affiliated political
action committee for loan repayment illegally commingled treasury and committee funds);
FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., No. 77-2175 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 21, 1977) (solicita-
tion of contributions from more than one million "members" of incorporated ideological
organization; FEC charges violation of ban on soliciting funds from general public).
45. The FEC, an agency without hearing examiners, is not structured to adjudicate
factual disputes. Interview with Van Gelder, supra note 27; cf. interview with Gora, supra
note 36 (FEC insists it is unable to find facts and develop formal record).
46. Monaghan, supra note 6, at 522-24; cf. interview with Oldaker, supra note 13.
47. See note 36 supra.
48. See p. 1204 supra.
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must choose between the burdensome alternatives of a conciliation
agreement or litigation.49 Yet at this stage, the FEC does not give
the respondent sufficient access to the staff's information and evidence
to allow effective rebuttal.
The 1979 amendments provide that, if the staff recommends entry
into conciliation, the respondent shall receive a brief setting forth the
law and facts supporting the staff's position and shall have fifteen days
in which to submit a reply brief before the Commission decides on the
staff's recommendation." Although this is a substantial improvement
over the prior practice,51 the respondent still is denied access to the
documents, correspondence, interrogatories, deposition transcripts, and
audit workpapers that support the staff's view of the facts. Such access
is essential for effective rebuttal by the respondent5 2 because the staff
may have acquired material that is incomplete, erroneous, or unfamiliar
to the respondent.53
49. See note 33 supra.
50. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(3) (West Supp. 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15122 (1980) (to be
codified in 11 C.F.R. § 111.16).
51. By contrast, under the 1976 legislation the staff did not even inform the respondent
that it was about to recommend conciliation and refused to give the respondent a copy
of its report to the Commission. Interviews with attorneys for respondents in FEC enforce-
ment cases, including: Bolton, supra note 36; Gora, supra note 36; Paul Kamenar, attorney
for defendants in several FEC civil enforcement actions, by telephone (April 26, 1979).
52. Interview with Bolton, supra note 36. On a number of occasions, respondents'
attorneys have asked not only for a copy of the staff report but also for access to eviden-
tiary materials gathered during the investigation. E.g., MUR 384, General Counsel's
Report, March 22, 1978, at 2 (referring to respondent's Motion for Leave to Review
Evidence Obtained Through Investigation); MUR 236/266, letter from Donald IV. Fisher,
attorney for respondent, to David Spiegel, FEC staff attorney (Oct. 11, 1977) (requesting
notice of depositions and opportunity to attend); FEC's Answers to Interrogatories of De-
fendant The Spotlight at 4, FEC v. The Spotlight, No. 78-1544 (D.D.C., filed Aug. 17,
1978) (asking for detailed descriptions or disclosure of documents regarding Commission
enforcement proceedings against respondent).
In several administrative contexts, courts have recognized the dangers of unfairness if
the respondent may not rebut material on which the agency bases its decision. E.g.,
Shively v. Stewart, 65 Cal. 2d 475, 479-80, 421 P.2d 65, 68, 55 Cal. Rptr. 217, 220 (1966)
(in disciplinary proceeding, licensed physicians may obtain discovery of information held
by agency to permit full opportunity to prepare defense); Mazza v. Cavicchia, 15 N.J. 498,
515-16, 105 A.2d 545, 555 (1954) (agency head may not use hearing examiner's report un-
less report is disclosed to litigant, permitting rebuttal of erroneous conclusions or factual
blunders); cf. Schwartz, Institutional Administrative Decisions and the Morgan Cases: A
Re-examination, 4 J. PUB. L. 49, 88 (1955) (agency should disclose staff memorandums to
private parties and permit filing of execptions). Although recognizing that the Freedom of
Information Act is not a substitute for discovery in agency adjudicative proceedings, courts
have acknowledged the criticism that refusing to allow respondents access to agency factual
materials amounts to "trial by ambush." New England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB,
548 F.2d 377, 387 (1st Cir. 1976); Capital Cities Communications, Inc. v. NLRB, 409 F.
Supp. 971, 977 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
53. Bolton, supra note 4, at 50; interviews with: attorney for respondent, supra note
29; attorney for respondents, supra note 36.
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The FEC staff has resisted disclosure of information to respondents
on the grounds that files must remain secret to assure effective in-
vestigations, 54 that staff reports are protected by the work-product
privilege,5 - and that the Federal Election Campaign Act guarantees the
confidentiality of investigations5 6 They argue further that disclosure
of their material would aid the defense and that respondents' attorneys
should do their own work.57
These arguments are unconvincing. At the threshold of conciliation,
the staff report and supporting evidentiary materials are more closely
analogous to the brief and exhibits of one of the contending parties in
an adjudicative proceeding than to internal, privileged records. 8 Thus,
the policy reasons for recognizing the investigative-files or work-pro-
duct privileges are absent.59 The statutory guarantee of confidentiality
is designed to protect the respondent from prejudicial and unverified
disclosures,60 not to hide information from him. Finally, the FEC
should not object to facilitating the respondent's defense; its role is
not to penalize as many respondents as possible but to enforce the
election laws fairly. Thus, the FEC's withholding of evidentiary in-
54. Interview with Oldaker, supra note 13. Under the investigatory records exemption
of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1976), materials may be
withheld if their disclosure would interfere with enforcement proceedings, prevent a fair
trial or impartial adjudication, violate personal privacy, disclose confidential sources or
investigative techniques, or endanger law enforcement personnel. See generally New
England Medical Center Hosp. v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 377 (Ist Cir. 1976) (denial of FOIA
request upheld on basis of investigatory records exemption); I K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE
L W TREATISE § 5:39 (2d ed. 1978) (discussion of investigatory records exemption).
55. Interview with Van Gelder, supra note 27. The work-product privilege, developed
in the context of civil litigation, Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 509-14 (1947); FED. R.
Civ. P. 26(b)(3), also has been applied in the administrative context. National Courier
Ass'n v. Board of Govs. of Fed. Reserve Sys., 516 F.2d 1229, 1241-42 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(privilege protects internal memorandums embodying deliberative processes of agency
and staff).
Recently, in a complainant's suit against the FEC for failing to act promptly on the
complaint, the court stated in dictum that the work-product privilege precluded access by
the respondent to FEC investigative records during investigation. Common Cause v. FEC,
FED. ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING GUIDE (CCH) C 9089 at n.6 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1979).
56. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(12) (West Supp. 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15123 (1980) (to be
codified in 11 C.F.R. § 111.21).
57. Interviews with: Oldaker, supra note 13; Van Gelder, supra note 27.
58. See p. 1204 supra.
59. The investigative-files and work-product doctrines protect the parties' ability to
assemble material into a coherent whole before exposing it to outside scrutiny. See Hick-
man v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11 (1947). At the decisionmaking stage, however, they
do not deprive the defendant of access to the evidence suporting the prosecution's case.
At either an administrative hearing or a trial, the decision must be made solely on the
basis of evidence entered formally into the record and thus revealed to the defendant.
60. A notification of violation or investigation may be disclosed by the FEC if the
respondent gives written consent. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(12)(A) (West Supp. 1980); 45 Fed.
Reg. 15080, 15123 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R. § 111.21).
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formation at the pivotal "probable cause to believe" stage is unjusti-
fied.
B. Insufficient Right of Reply
Along with inadequate access to information, respondents are per-
mitted insufficient opportunity to argue before the commissioners, thus
giving the agency staff disproportionate influence over Commission
decisionmaking.0 ' Although respondents may submit written briefs,
they have no right to oral argument. Once the briefs have been sub-
mitted, the Commission can reach enforcement decisions in closed
sessions at which the General Counsel and staff attorneys support the
staff report. The respondent has no similar opportunity to present his
case in person and to answer questions. 2
Commissioners and staff have opposed oral argument, contending that
respondents' written submissions and the staff report give the Com-
mission a fair and effective presentation of the respondents' position, 3
and that oral argument would be excessively costly and time-consum-
ing.04 Oral arguments, however, can force a decisionmaker to focus
61. Before the 1979 amendments, the FEC did not inform respondents of the staff's
contentions and was not statutorily required to consider respondents' arguments at the
preconciliation stage. Interviews with: Bolton, supra note 36; Gora, supra note 36;
Kamenar, supra note 51; Walter Moore, former executive assistant to Commissioner Neil
Staebler, by telephone (April 16, 1979); Loren Smith, attorney in MUR 406, by telephone
(April 30, 1979). Respondents' positions were presented to the Commission primarily
through the staff report, which sometimes presented an incomplete or inaccurate ac-
count. Interviews with: Bolton, supra note 36; Kamenar, supra note 51.
62. See FEC's Answers to Interrogatories, supra note 28, at 6; Moore, supra note 4, at
60; interviews with: Bolton, supra note 36; Moore, supra note 61; former attorney, Office
of General Counsel, FEC, by telephone (April 30, 1979). A number of observers have noted
the Commission's deference to its legal staff. Interviews with: Baran, supra note 32;
James Schoener, former staff member, Senate Rules Committee, by telephone (April 23,
1979); former staff attorney, Office of General Counsel, FEC, by telephone (April 20, 1979).
From May 1976 to May 1979, the Commission followed the staff's recommendation on
whether to dismiss or to enter into conciliation in 211 of the 219 MUR's in which it had
authorized an investigation. Although some of these were clear-cut cases, others raised
substantial factual and legal issues. Author's review of FEC enforcement files.
63. Interviews with: Baran, supra note 32; John G. Murphy, Jr., former General
Counsel, FEC, in Washington, D.C. (May 24, 1979); Neil Staebler, former member, Federal
Election Commission, by telephone (April 23, 1979); Van Gelder, supra note 27.
64. Hearings on 1979 Amendments, supra note 4, at 151; interviews with: Aikens, sup/ra
note 28; Baran, supra note 32; Tiernan, supra note 33; Van Gelder, supra note 27; execu-
tive assistant to FEC member, in Washington, D.C. (May 22, 1979).
General Counsel Oldaker asserted that, if respondents were allowed even a brief oral
argument, every respondent who faced any risk of "civil or political penalties" would
demand an oral argument, resulting in hundreds of such hearings each year. Thus, he
argued, providing a right to oral argument would entail the abandonment of the
simplified, streamlined current procedure and the adoption of a full panoply of hearing
examiners-which would cause much greater expense and delay for respondents and the
Commission. Interview with Oldaker, supra note 13.
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on the central issues of a case and permit him to resolve uncertainties
by asking questionsOa The FEC's cost argument is exaggerated. Be-
cause oral argument is expensive, respondents are unlikely to exercise
the option unless they have grounds to believe that it would significant-
ly strengthen their position. 0
C. Failure to Provide a Statement of Reasons
The Commission never states reasons for actions it has taken at the
various procedural stages. After closing a case by dismissal, conciliation,
or litigation, the FEC places the major documents relating to the case,
including staff reports to the Commission, in a public file. 7 However,
the Commission adopts only the staff's recommendations, not its legal
reasoning,0 8 with which the commissioners have sometimes disagreed.69
Failure to provide reasons for enforcement actions impairs the quality
of the Commission's decisionmaking. The commissioners may decide on
a course of action without majority agTeement on an interpretation of
the law or its application to the facts. This reduces the coherence and
65. Cf. E. RE, BRIEF WRITING AND ORAL ARGUMENT 176 (4th ed. 1974) (argument clarifies
positions in brief); Schmeltzer & Kitzes, supra note 38, at 870 (fairness would be enhanced
by respondent's oral presentation to agency heads before imposition of civil penalties).
Several commentators have pointed to these advantages in calling for oral argument before
the FEC. Interviews with: Bolton, supra note 36; Thomas Curtis, former member, Federal
Election Commission, by telephone (April 17, 1979); Gora, supra note 36; Smith, supra
note 61.
66. Counsel fees are the largest element in respondent's expenses for oral argument.
Interviews with Baran, supra note 32; Bolton, supra note 36; cf. Scott, Standing in the
Supreme Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REv. 645, 673-74 (1973) (costs of litiga-
tion serve as substantial screening barrier and assure that plaintiffs will have adequate
stake in outcome of controversy).
67. The statute requires public disclosure of conciliation agreements and dismissals of
enforcement cases. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(4)(B)(ii) (West Supp. 1980). These materials are
available at the FEC's offices in Washington, D.C. In June 1979, the Commission began
to publish summaries of selected closed compliance cases in its monthly newsletter, the
FEC REcoRD.
68. A certification of the Commission's votes recites that the Commission has voted to
adopt the recommendations of the General Counsel's Report, not that it has voted to
adopt the report. Author's review of FEC enforcement files; Plaintiff's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at
6, Brown v. FEC, No. 79-0940 (D.D.C., filed April 2, 1979).
69. See FEC REcoRD, October 1979, at 4 ("Commission's actions are not necessarily
based on, or in agreement with, the General Counsel's analysis."); interviews with: Baran,
supra note 32; Harris, supra note 13; Moore, supra note 61; former FEC attorney, supra
note 62.
The Commission occasionally adopts the General Counsel's Report as a statement of
reasons. E.g., Motion of FEC to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim at 9, Hampton v.
FEC, FED. ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING GUIDE (CCH) 9036 (D.D.C., April 15, 1977),
aff'd, No. 77-1546 (D.C. Cir. July 21, 1978) (General Counsel's statement of reasons was
sufficient grounds for FEC's dismissal of complaint).
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predictability of enforcement decisions and deprives political partici-
pants of a guide to the Commission's interpretation of the law.7 °
Commission sources argue that the need to seek agreement on reasons
as well as on action-and to produce written opinions-would delay the
disposition of cases, reduce the Commission's case-by-case flexibility,
and burden the Commission and its staff.7 ' In addition, they contend
that statements of reasons might mislead candidates and committees,
because a changing body of six people is prone to change its policies.72
They maintain that the present procedure for obtaining advisory
opinions7" is sufficient to provide guidance in unclear areas of the
law.7 4
But decisionmakers who cannot agree on the reasons for their de-
terminations may reach arbitrary-if prompt-results. 3 The FEC exag-
gerates the cost of a statement of reasons; additional time and effort
would be required only when the commissioners do not agree with the
rationale in the staff reports.76 Moreover, flexibility should not be
purchased at the price of clarity. Legitimate variations in result can
and should be explained; changes in policy should be announced and
applied prospectively. Stating reasons for decisions would supplement
the advisory opinion process as a needed guide to interpretation.7 7
70. Moore, supra note 4, at 61-62; interviews with: Bolton, supra note 36; Gora, supra
note 36; Kamenar, supra note 51; Moore, supra note 61; Murphy, supra note 63; journalist,
in Washington, D.C. (May 22, 1979).
71. Interviews with: Oldaker, supra note 13; executive assistant, supra note 64.
72. Interview with Van Gelder, supra note 27. Commissioner Tiernan opposed the
disclosure of Commission deliberations, even in closed cases, on the ground that respondents
in other pending matters before the Commission would be able to use the information to
shape their presentations to the Commission. Interview with Tiernan, supra note 33.
73. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437f (West Supp. 1980).
74. Interviews with: executive assistant, supra note 64; FEC staff member, in Wash-
ington, D.C. (May 25, 1979).
75. 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TrATISE § 16.00, at 559-61, 564 (Supp. 1970); see
Friendly, "Some Kind of Hearing," 123 U. PA. L. Rlv. 1267, 1292 (1975).
76. In the majority of cases, the Commissioners could simply adopt the staff's state-
ment of reasons. Interviews with: Harris, supra note 13; Staebler, supra note 63.
77. The advisory opinion procedure is inadequate. Although the 1979 amendments
allow all persons-not only officeholders, candidates, political committees, and national
party committees, as provided by the 1976 legislation-to seek advisory opinions with
respect to a specific transaction or activity by the person, 2 U.S.C.A. § 437f(a) (West Supp.
1980), opinions cannot be issued in "h)potbetical" cases, no matter how detailed. 45 Fed.
Reg. 15080, 15123 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R. § 112.1). A person seeking an opinion
must publicly commit himself to an intention to undertake the proposed activity. In the
past, the slowness of the procedure has discouraged many political participants from
seeking advisory opinions. CAMPAIGN FINANCE STUDY GROUP, INSTITUTE OF POLITICS,
KENNEDY SCHOOL OF GOV'T, HARVARD UNIV., FOR HOUSE COMM. ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION,
96TH CONG., IST SEss., AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL ELECTION CAMPAIGN
AcT, 1972-78, at 139-41 (Comm. Print 1979); Moore, supra note 4, at 61-62. The amend-
ments set a 60-day deadline for FEC action on advisory opinion requests, 20 days in the
60-day period before an election, 2 U.S.C.A. § 437f(a) (West Supp. 1980); 45 Fed. Reg. 15080,
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D. Burdensome Conciliation Policy
In addition to the FEC's insufficient disclosure to respondents, in-
sufficient right of reply, and failure to provide a statement of reasons-
three strictly procedural matters-the FEC's policies regarding concilia-
tion negotiations have provoked frequent complaints from respondents.
Respondents perceive the FEC's approach to conciliation as an integral
and unreasonable part of its burdensome enforcement procedure.7 8
The FEC enjoys a strong bargaining position in conciliation negotia-
tions, because of the pressures on respondents to settle rather than
litigate.7 1 Taking advantage of its position, the staff frequently plays
the role of an advocate when it proposes conciliation terms, 0 attempting
to impose a view of the facts or the law that would be difficult to sustain
in court, where it would bear the burden of proof.8 ' The Commission
routinely demands a direct admission of violation at the outset of
negotiations, '-' agreeing to an indirect admission of violation or neutral
15124 (1980) (to be codified in 11 C.F.R. § 112.4). However, recognizing political reality,
the legislative history expressly states that 3-3 Commission deadlocks, which have oc-
curred in the past on party financing and labor/business issues, Moore, Comment, supra
note 36, constitute Commission "action" in compliance with the 60-day limit. H.R. RP.
No. 422, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 20 (1979); see 45 Fed. Reg. 15080, 15124 (1980) (to be codified
in 11 C.F.R. § 112.4(a)).
78. See note 85 infra.
79. See note 36 supra.
80. Author's analysis of enforcement cases; see Defendants' Response to FEC's Motions
at 4, FEC v. Bell, No. 79-1891 (D.D.C., filed July 20, 1979); letter from Eastman, supra
note 32; letter from Secchia, supra note 32; interview with Smith, supra note 61.
81. Hearings on 1979 Amendments, suPra note 4, at 160 (statement by Meehan); 125
CONG. REc. S11,212-15 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); see, e.g., FEC
v. Central Long Island Tax Reform Immediately (CLITRIM), No. 79-3014 (2d Cir. Feb.
5, 1980); FEC v. American Fed'n of State, County & Mun. Employees, FED. ELECTION
CAMPAIGN FINANCING GUIDE (CCH) 9078 (D.D.C. May 14, 1979).
82. Interviews with: Aikens, supra note 28; Baran, supra note 32; Staebler, supra note
63; attorney for respondents, supra note 29; executive assistant, supra note 64; former
FEC attorney, supra note 62. Responses to questionnaires frequently noted a stated
FEC policy of insisting on an admission of violation. General Counsel's Reports also
referred to the crucial importance of an admission. E.g., MUR's 218, 274, 515, 623.
In some agreements, the respondent is required to promise not only that he will not
repeat the activities in question, but that he will not violate broad provisions of the
Federal Election Campaign Act or the entire Act. Conciliation agreements on public file,
FEC, Washington, D.C. These ill-defined promises may be enforced in federal district
court by the FEC, which may obtain relief by establishing a violation, in whole or in
part, of any requirement of the agreement. 2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(5)(D) (West Supp. 1980).
As of December 1979, the FEC had brought two enforcement actions under this provision.
Litigation Status Sheet, January 1980, Press Office, FEC; FEC RECORD, December 1979, at
6. The possibility of such enforcement may exert an inhibiting effect on signers of
conciliation agreements. Interview with Bolton, supra note 5; cf. 0. Fiss, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS INJUNCTION 13 (1978) (broad commands may deter, apart from penalty for viola-
tion, because costs are imposed on defendant by very assertion of claim of violation and
necessity of defending enforcement proceeding).
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consent-decree language only after expensive and time-consuming nego-
tiations.83
Yet the statute does not require the Commission to insist on an ad-
mission of violation in a conciliation agreement, and the acceptance
of consent-decree language-which is frequently permitted by other
administrative agencies 4-would better serve the purposes of a "con-
ciliation" process. 85 In response to criticisms of its conciliation policy,
the FEC contends that agreement is voluntary and that an admission
of violation serves remedial purposes.8s But the FEC's rigid conciliation
policy imposes excessive burdens on respondents, either by impelling
them into costly litigation to seek vindication or by requiring them
to accept the FEC's terms of conciliation when the pressures of time,
money, or publicity preclude a judicial determination.
III. First Amendment Due Process
Unfair in practice, FEC procedures also are constitutionally defec-
tive. Under the First Amendment, procedural safeguards are required
whenever the government regulates or burdens potentially protected
83. On average, MUR's leading to conciliation agreements lasted nearly 12 months
from complaint to agreement. Twenty-one MUR's with complex, disputed issues of fact or
law averaged more than 14 months. In eight of these MUR's the agreements included
direct admissions of violation ("respondent violated Section X of the Act"); in four others,
they included indirect admissions ("Section X of the Act prohibits activity Y; respondent
did Y"). In the disputed cases in which the respondent succeeded in avoiding any ad-
mission of violation, the enforcement process lasted an average of 18 months.
Commission sources acknowledge that the respondent is more likely to obtain favorable
language after a lengthy conciliation process. Interviews with: Baran, supra note 32;
Harris, supra note 13. Extended negotiations, however, impose considerable costs on
respondents. More than half of the respondents who answered the author's questionnaire
stated that the proceeding imposed a significant financial burden; comments referied
most frequently to attorneys' fees. Approximately one-quarter of the questionnaires in-
dicated ligal fees in excess of $1000 for the conciliation process.
The amendments limit the Commission's attempts to conciliate to 90 dals, 2 U.S.C.A.
§ 437g(a)(4)(A)(i) (West Supp. 1980). To some extent, the amendments may increase the
pressures on respondents to accept unsatisfactory terms before the Commission ceases to
attempt conciliation.
84. E.g., Federal Trade Commission, 16 C.F.R. § 3.25 (1980); Securities and Exchange
Commission, 17 C.F.R. § 201.8(a) (1979).
85. Bolton, supra note 4, at 50; letter from Eastman, supra note 32; interview with
Smith, supra note 61. The Commission's policy of demanding an admission of violation
is a major obstacle to conciliation, causing delays and sometimes ultimate failure to
reach agreement. Interviews with: Baran, supra note 32; Gora, supra note 36; Kamenar,
supra note 51; Meehan, supra note 36; Oldaker, supra note 13; former FEC staff member,
by telephone (April 17, 1979).
86. Interviews with: Aikens, supra note 28; Harris, supra note 13. The standard form
for a conciliation agreement states that "respondent enters voluntarily into this concilia-
tion agreement." Interviews and questionnaires indicate that this language is often pro
forma and does not accurately reflect respondent's views.
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expression.8 7 Because of the high value placed on freedom of expres-
sion, these requirements are more stringent than conventional Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees for civil proceed-ins88
The FEC's enforcement procedures fall directly within the ambit
of the stricter standards. The FEC, by regulating contributions and
expenditures that are indispensable to political communication, regu-
lates "an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. ' 9
Although the FEC lacks the unilateral power to impose formal re-
straints and sanctions, a procedure's practical effects on the exercise of
free expression also must meet First Amendment standards. The FEC's
procedures fail to satisfy constitutional strictures.
A. Unduly Burdensome Procedures: Two Criteria
The First Amendment invalidates unduly burdensome procedures
that deter protected expression. Two principles have emerged to define
87. First Amendment due process principles are most frequently enunciated in cases
challenging state procedures for making obscenity determinations. See, e.g., Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559-61 (1975) (exclusion of rock musical from
municipal theater on grounds of alleged obscenity requires judicial determination); Freed-
man v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-59 (1965) (censorship proceeding must assure promptjudicial review before final order). The principles also have been applied to the regula-
tion of political activity, Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
181-83 (1968) (injunction against disruptive political rallies requires adversary proceeding);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21, 525-26 (1958) (state has burden of proof in denying
tax exemption for subversive advocacy), and to federal as well as state law, Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416-18 (1971) (denial of postal services to obscenity dealers requires
prompt judicial proceedings). See generally Monaghan, supra note 6, at 518.
These procedural requirements apply without regard to the substantive validity of the
regulations or burdens that the state imposes. Frequently, the Court has reached the
procedural question first and declined to decide the substantive issue. E.g., Southeastern
Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 (1975); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513,
519-20 (1958).
88. ' Some procedures that satisfy conventional due process fail to satisfy the stricter
standards of First Amendment due process. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730-31
(1961) (procedures for seizure of gambling paraphernalia and contraband liquor insuf-
ficient for seizing allegedly obscene materials); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-53
(1959) (constitution requires scienter for bookseller's obscenity conviction, though not for
most crimes); Monaghan, sulira note 6, at 518-19.
89. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14 (1976). The Supreme Court has stated explicitly
that, "[Tjhe constitutional guarantee has its fullest and most urgent application precisely
to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S.
265, 271-72 (1971).
The need for procedural protection in the regulation of political activity may be greater
than in the regulation of obscenity. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394
U.S. 147, 162-63 (1969) (Harlan, J., concurring) (procedural delay has more severe impact
on civil rights demonstration than on exhibition of motion pictures); Carroll v. President &
Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 182 (1968) (notice and hearing more essential
before forbidding political rally than before banning allegedly obscence books).
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an unconstitutional burden on expression. The first principle holds
that a procedure must not create an undue likelihood that protected
expression will be penalized. 0 Application of this principle, most
frequently in obscenity cases, has generated several specific rules: the
state must always bear the burden of proof;9t final restraints on
speech may be imposed only by judicial determination in an adversary
proceeding; 92 preliminary restraints must be "limited to preservation
of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible with sound
judicial resolution. ' 9 3
The second principle of First Amendment due process is that a pro-
cedure must not unnecessarily impose heavy costs upon the defense of
First Amendment rights.9 4 The prospect of a protracted, costly defense
might induce self-censorship and thus chill protected speech.a Al-
though this principle has not been stated as frequently or directly as
the first principle, it emerges clearly from a number of First Amend-
ment cases. The Supreme Court has invoked the principle in decisions
preventing further prosecutions under facially unconstitutional statutes,
by allowing a defendant who has engaged in unprotected activity to
challenge the constitutionality of a statute that might otherwise be
90. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); note 87 supra (citing cases). In
these cases, the Court focuses only upon the undue likelihood of erroneous determinations
and does not explicitly consider whether that burden could be justified. Implicitly, it
might be suggesting that since the state can achieve its objectives by a "less drastic
means"-a procedure with more safeguards-it cannot justify the existing procedure.
91. Thus, expression will be protected from the risk of nonpersuasion. See Freedman
v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
92. E.g., Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417-18 (1971) (statute must provide for judicial
review); Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) (ju-
dicial proceeding must be adversarial).
93. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 59, 61 (1965).
94. In Freedman, avoidance of "unduly expensive and protracted" litigation, id. at 61,
was distinct from the likelihood of vindication in court. In every reported case, the
Maryland Court of Appeals had reversed disapproval by the State Board of Censors. Id.
at 58 nA.
95. In a recent case, for instance, the Court recognized that an ill-defined prohibition
against certain corporate political activities would deter protected expression by creating
the threat of penalties. "In addition, the burden and expense of litigating the issue-
especially when what must be established is a complex and amorphous economic relation-
ship-would unduly impinge on the exercise of the constitutional right. '[T]he free
dissemination of ideas [might] be the loser.'" First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 785 n.21 (1978); accord, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52-53 (1971)
(plurality opinion) (possibility of expensive and protracted litigation sufficient threat to
inhibit protected discussion).
As Professor Monaghan declares, "[I]n the area of freedom of speech the procedures
associated with the penalty (e.g., arrest, pretrial detention, etc.) often discourage challenge
to the underlying statute or ordinance far more than the penalty it contains." Monaghan,
supra note 6, at 548 n.122; cf. Note, The Role of Summary Judgment in Political Libel
Cases, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 1783, 1808-09 (1979) (expense of litigating libel actions may induce
self-censorship by media, infringing First Amendment rights).
1216
Federal Election Commission
used to prosecute protected expression, 0 or by granting declaratory
judgment that a statute is invalid.97 Recently, with the Court's ap-
proval, an enforcement procedure has been upheld against First Amend-
ment challenge because proposed alternatives would impose even
greater costs on defendants, thus increasing the chilling effect.08
Procedures for regulating First Amendment activity must strike a
balance between these two principles. The rule requiring a judicial
determination before any sanction can be imposed on protected activity
illustrates the tension between the two principles. In Freedman v. Mary-
land,"" the Supreme Court held that in order to satisfy the need for
accurate determinations, only courts may legitimately impose restraints
on expression, "because only a judicial determination in an adversary
proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expres-
sion."100 Yet, as applied to the FEC, this rule would be prohibitively
96. An essential element of the First Amendment "overbreadth doctrine" is the
recognition that the threat of the "expense and inconvenience of criminal prosecution"
will have an inhibiting effect on those "who validly exercise their rights of free expres-
sion." Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959).
97. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967) (granting declaratory judgment in-
validating political pamphleting statute because delay accompanying criminal proceed-
ings "might itself effect the impermissible chilling of the very constitutional right he
seeks to protect"); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (granting declaratory and
injunctive relief against prosecutions and threatened prosecutions for alleged violations
of state subversive activities control laws by civil rights groups). In Dombrowski, ap-
pellants alleged that the threats of enforcement were made in bad faith as part of a plan
of harassment. Despite the likelihood of acquittal in state courts, the Court asserted,
"The chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights may derive from the
fact of the prosecution, unaffected by the prospects of its success or failure." Id. at 487.
It granted relief to avoid "making vindication of freedom of expression await the outcome
of protracted litigation." Id.
Although more recent cases, on grounds of federalism, have limited the power of the
federal courts to enjoin state proceedings, Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1117-60
(1977), the substantive analysis of First Amendment burdens in the earlier cases has not
been questioned. Furthermore, considerations of federalism are not involved in FEC en-
forcement because the agency enforces only federal laws.
98. Milky Way Prods., Inc. v. Leary, 305 F. Supp. 288, 297 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (three-judge
court, Frankel, J.), aff'd inem. sub noin. New York Feed Co. v. Leary, 397 U.S. 98 (1970).
It refused to require an adversary hearing prior to the arrest of an alleged distributor of
pornography, noting, '[T]he inhibitions are not avoided by the new procedure plaintiffs
want; they are, if anything, pushed back to an earlier time of open contest when the
burden of litigation and a species of readier 'defeat' are likely to work their deterrent
effects." Id. at 297. Accord, Golden Eagle v. Johnson, 493 F.2d 1179, 1184 (9th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975) (arrest of individual claiming religious justification for
possession and use of peyote requires no special probable cause determination); Krahm
v. Graham, 461 F.2d 703, 709 (9th Cir. 1972) (vacating injunction requiring adversary
hearings before future arrests for sale of obscene materials).
99. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
100. Id. at 58. The Court based this assertion on its view of the institutional differences
between courts and agencies. Id. at 57-58 ("Because the censor's business is to censor, there
inheres the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court-part of an indepen-
dent branch of government-to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression.");
see Monaghan, supra note 6, at 520-24.
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expensive for many respondents. Political campaigns often are short on
time and money and would suffer from the adverse publicity of FEC
allegations. An open judicial hearing might impose considerably greater
burdens on political expression than a prompt and fair administrative
proceeding, even in situations in which the case was ultimately dis-
missed, and a judicial finding of violation might be more costly and
more disruptive than a conciliation agreement.' 0 ' Therefore, in many
FEC cases, judicial determination would be a burden rather than a
benefit. To resolve the tension between the two principles, procedures
must be sensitive to the circumstances of expression. 102
B. The FEC's Failure to Meet the Constitutional Tests
The FEC's procedures violate both First Amendment due process
principles: they unnecessarily increase the likelihood of imposing sanc-
tions on protected speech and they generate excessive defense costs.
1. Danger of Erroneous Determination
The respondent can best avoid damaging admissions and restrictions
on political activity by winning a dismissal of his case at the threshold
of conciliation. The obstacles to an effective defense in the FEC's pre-
conciliation proceedings, however, create a significant danger that pro-
tected speech will be penalized. The FEC's refusal to reveal the eviden-
tiary basis for its conclusions places a respondent at a considerable dis-
advantage in any attempt to persuade the Commission to reject the
staff's unfavorable recommendations. Even under the less stringent
standards of conventional due process, access to evidentiary files may be
constitutionally required. 0 3 Certainly, under the stricter procedural re-
quirements of the First Amendment, the FEC policy of refusing to
101. See note 36 sutra.
During the pendency of the suit, the respondent may feel compelled to desist from
the questioned activity in order to avoid augmenting the penalties in the event of an
adverse decision. See, e.g., Findings of Fact at 83, FEC v. CLITRIM, No. 78C-1658 (E.D.N.Y.
Aug. 22, 1979); Conciliation agreement in MUR 283/350, signed by New Jersey Education
Ass'n; Statement of Points and Authorities in Support of Counterclaimants' Motions at
1-2, 5, 15, filed by Public Service Research Council and Public Service PAC, in FEC v.
National Right to Work Comm., No. 77-2175 (D.D.C., filed Dec. 21, 1977).
102. As the Court wrote in Speiser v. Randall, "[Tihe operation and effect of the
method by which speech is sought to be restrained must be subjected to close analysis and
critical judgment in the light of the particular circumstances to which it is applied." 357
U.S. 513, 520 (1958).
103. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 338, 345-46 (1976) (procedures upheld
because agency provided access to relevant evidence, thus reducing danger of error);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972) (before final revocation decision, parolee
must receive written notice of claimed violations and disclosure of evidence against him).
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give the respondent access to evidentiary material provides inadequate
safeguards for accuracy.
Similarly, the respondent's lack of an adequate right of reply in FEC
proceedings is constitutionally unacceptable. By denying the respondent
a right to oral argument before the Commission,10 4 the FEC creates a
substantial risk of erroneous decision. Although conventional due pro-
cess may not require oral arguments in agency decisionmaking,1°5 the
First Amendment cases suggest that the opportunity for oral argument
by the respondent is necessary before the Commission decides whether
to dismiss or to enter into conciliation. 00 This protection would help
innocent respondents prevail against adverse recommendations by the
FEC's legal staff.
The practice of making decisions at all enforcement stages without a
statement of reasons inhibits the development of fully articulated and
mutually agreed interpretations of facts and law, and thus enhances the
danger of erroneous determination. First Amendment due process re-
quires a procedure that "focus[es] searchingly on" whether the expres-
sion is protected or unprotected. 0 7 A clearer articulation of the Com-
mission's premises for decisions would promote more careful delibera-
tion on the merits' 08 and reduce the ambiguity and inconsistency of
the campaign finance laws.' 0 9
104. Most critics of the FEC's procedures do not call for full-scale evidentiary hearings.
Rather, they advocate oral argument before the Commission-an opportunity for the
respondent to discuss the facts and law and to answer the commissioners' questions. See
interviews cited notes 61 & 65 supra.
105. See 2 K. DAvis, supra note 54, at § 10.9; cf. FCC v. WJR, 337 U.S. 265, 274-77
(1949) (competing radio station has no right to oral argument on challenge to new per-
mit; no general due process rule requiring oral argument before agency).
106. The Court has held that the First Amendment requires an adversary judicial
proceeding before the imposition of restraints on speech. See Carroll v. President &
Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
58 (1965). In Carroll, condemning a state court's ex parte temporary injunction against
political rallies, the Court noted that First Amendment adjudication involved imprecise
legal standards and turned upon "subtle and controversial considerations and upon a
delicate assessment of the particular situation." Thus, the Court asserted, "In the absence
of evidence and argument offered by both sides and of their participation in the formula-
tion of value judgments, there is insufficient assurance of the balanced analysis and care-
ful conclusions which are essential in the area of First Amendment adjudication." 393
U.S. at 183.
Applying this reasoning to the FEC's de facto adjudicative proceeding, which deals
with inescapably imprecise standards and delicate case-by-case assessments, participation
by respondents in Commission deliberations is required.
107. Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964) (quoting Marcus v. Search
Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)); cf. Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne,
393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) (need for delicate assessment and balanced analysis).
108. See note 75 suPra. Statements of reasons by the FEC also would facilitate judicial
review, available to the complainant when the FEC dismisses an enforcement case. 2
U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(8) (West Supp. 1980).
109. The advisory opinion process provides insufficient interpretive guidance to politi-
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The Commission's present conciliation policy also creates an undue
likelihood that sanctions will be imposed on protected expression. Al-
though acceptance of a conciliation agreement is legally voluntary, the
concept of knowing and deliberate waiver of procedural rights" ° does
not apply in the First Amendment area when a party "cooperates" with
the government only to avoid threatened compulsion."' In FEC en-
forcement, innocent respondents under strong political and financial
pressures may capitulate to the FEC's demands for admissions of viola-
tion, penalties, and unduly broad prohibitions of future activity. '"'
2. Excessive Defense Costs
Whether they result in conciliation agreements or litigation, enforce-
ment proceedings often impose unnecessary defense costs on respon-
dents and thereby violate the second principle of First Amendment due
process. The preconciliation procedural defects impose greater fact-
finding costs on respondents 13 and reduce the likelihood that cases
against innocent parties will be dismissed.'" In the conciliation phase,
the FEC's initial insistence on an admission of violation and its failure
cal participants. See notes 13 & 77 sukra; cf. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 572, 575 (1973) (unconstitutional vagueness avoided
in Hatch Act enforcement because Commission had evolved rules and definitions of viola-
tive conduct on a case-by-case basis).
110. See Frank Irey, Jr., Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 519
F.2d 1200, 1206 (3d Cir. 1975) (employer's failure to file timely contest after notification
of violation constitutes knowing and intelligent waiver of right to hearing; imposition of
penalty does not violate due process).
111. In Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963), the "Rhode Island Com-
mission to Encourage Morality in Youth," id. at 59, like the FEC, had no formal power
to impose final sanctions; it could only declare that certain literature was unfit for
circulation to minors and recommend prosecution by the district attorney. Like the
FEC, the commission nevertheless sought to achieve compliance. It successfully used the
threat of court proceedings to convince distributors to withdraw objectionable materials
from circulation. Although the dissent observed that an "affected" party wishing to
"stand his ground" could obtain a court determination, id. at 78 (Harlan, J., dissenting),
the majority insisted that the practical effectiveness of the restraint procedure made it un-
constitutional. The FEC's procedures create analogous pressures on respondents to enter
into conciliation agreements rather than to go to court. Under these circumstances, the
waiver principle should not be used to defeat the constitutional requirement of pro-
cedural safeguards for freedom of expression. Cf. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58,
59 (1965) (constitutional requirement of judicial determination not satisfied when judicial
appeal of censorship decision deterred by expense and delay; censor's decision, in practice,
final).
112. See Carroll v. President & Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183, 184 (1968)
(order issued in area of First Amendment rights "must be tailored as precisely as possible
to the exact needs of the case"); FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 492-93 (1952) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting) (vague cease and desist order provides no guidance to offender or to
courts, creating danger of endless litigation).
113. See pp. 1207-08 supra.
114. See pp. 1207-08, 1210-11 supra.
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to accept more neutral language without time-consuming negotiations
contribute directly to respondents' costs without enhancing the effec-
tiveness of enforcement.11a If a respondent cannot negotiate an ac-
ceptable conciliation agreement, he may decide that vindication of his
rights and his political reputation requires a judicial determination.
Litigation imposes additional expense and adverse publicity on the
respondent. 10 The economic, political, and personal resources ex-
pended by respondents in defending against unnecessarily expensive
FEC enforcement proceedings may deter citizens from fully exercising
their rights to political expression. Some respondents have indicated
that the complexity, costs, and psychological burdens of FEC concilia-
tion will deter them from future political activity.1 7
IV. Procedural Reforms: Meeting Constitutional Standards
Once a burden on protected expression has been shown, a procedure
is constitutional only if there are no less restrictive alternatives to
achieve the government's legitimate objectives." 8 Administrative ef-
ficiency, convenience, and cost savings alone do not constitute a
sufficient governmental interest." 9 FEC procedures serve the legitimate
115. See pp. 1213-14 supra.
116. Litigation may impose a financial burden that respondents can ill afford. See
125 CoNG. Rac. S11,212-15 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1979) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) (discussing
burdens of FEC litigation against financially weak respondents).
117. Responses to conciliation agreement questionnaires, e.g., MUR 321 ("I was totally
disillusioned, disappointed, and terribly distressed over the charge and the harassment
that followed . . . . We will soon have no activists and then we're really in trouble.");
MUR 597 ("All indicate they will never again get active in politics; serves to take political
involvement away from people and vest operations in hands of expensive and costly
pros."); MUR xxx ("This Commission succeeded in keeping me away from politics in the
future."); cf. Findings of Fact, FEC v. CLITRIM, No. 78C-1658 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 1979)
(FEC investigation and civil suit against local and national committees of lobbying
organization has "caused widespread concern among the TRIM leaders and membership,
causing some to terminate their native support and making it more difficult to enlist
volunteer leadership and help").
118. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (interference with free expression
justified only if it furthers an "important or substantial governmental interest . . . un-
related to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that in-
terest."); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ("even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly
achieved"). See generally Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE
L.J. 464 (1969).
119. See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 529 (1958) (burden of ascertaining individual
facts is no justification for "short-cut procedure which must inevitably result in sup-
pressing protected speech"); cf. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 647
(1974) (administrative convenience does not justify conclusive presumption of unfitness of
woman to teach after fixed period of pregnancy).
1221
The Yale Law Journal
purpose of protecting the electoral process from abuse by requiring
public disclosure of campaign finance information "' and by limiting
the sources and amounts of campaign contributions.1 '. Nevertheless,
these goals could be achieved with less danger of erroneous determina-
tion and less cost to respondents.' 22 Procedures could be implemented
that would satisfy the least-drastic-means test and yet retain the flexi-
bility necessary for effective FEC enforcement.
First, the Commission should provide the respondent with sufficient
information to defend himself effectively. If the staff recommends
conciliation rather than dismissal, the respondent should receive not
only a brief fully setting forth the staff's position but also access to
supporting evidentiary material. 123 If the brief and evidentiary material
create a need for additional discovery, the respondent should be granted
reasonable extensions of time in which to secure the needed informa-
tion. While adding only marginally to the cost of FEC enforcement,
these reforms would markedly increase its fairness. In addition, the
formal requirement may encourage the staff to provide more informa-
tion voluntarily to respondents prior to the final report.
Second, the FEC should permit respondents to make oral arguments
to the Commission before it decides whether to enter into conciliation.
Oral argument would enhance the fairness and hence the legitimacy
of the procedure. Because of its expense to respondents, oral argument
would create only limited additional demands on the Commission's
time. 2 4
Third, the Commission should provide a formal statement of reasons
for each of its enforcement decisions, whether it dismisses a case or
proceeds into investigation, conciliation, or litigation. Adoption of the
staff report's arguments would be sufficient in most cases. Further-
120. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60-84 (1976).
121. Id. at 23-38.
122. Safeguards would increase the likelihood of dismissing appropriate cases, even if
they lengthen the enforcement process in earlier stages. If a violation has occurred, a
lengthier enforcement process would not be less effective, because FEC enforcement does
not currently depend on promptly publicizing violations before an election campaign is
over. Cases are rarely resolved against respondents until after the election. Author's
analysis of enforcement files. Investigations must be kept confidential while in progress,
2 U.S.C.A. § 437g(a)(12) (West Supp. 1980).
123. Disclosure of the staff's conclusions and evidentiary supporting materials at the
preconciliation stage balances the interests of the respondent in preparing an effective
defense with the need of the staff for confidentiality during the course of its investigation.
See pp. 1208-09 supra. A similar balance is sought in the rules governing pretrial discovery.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 510-12 (1947) (discussing purposes of discovery in
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). Although the FEC proceeding is not a formal ad-
judication, it has sufficient adversarial elements for the litigation analogy to be instructive.
124. See p. 1211 supra.
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more, when the Commission takes enforcement action, it should act in
a manner consistent with prior decisions or with a previously an-
nounced change in policy.
Finally, the Commission should employ a more flexible conciliation
policy, acknowledging its de facto adjudicative as well as its prosecu-
torial role. Instead of demanding admissions of violation as a matter
of policy in conciliation proceedings, the FEC should more readily
accept neutral language when the issues of fact or law are unclear. -12 5
This approach would reduce the likelihood that respondents who have
not violated the law will be forced to admit a violation and pay a
penalty. It also would save respondents and the government consider-
able expense by allowing conciliation agreements to be concluded more
quickly and by reducing the pressure to litigate for vindication. 2 6
These proposed changes in FEC enforcement policies would create
a hybrid, intermediate procedure12 7 that would recognize the reality of
the FEC's role in enforcing federal campaign laws and that would con-
form to the constitutional standards of First Amendment due process.
The changes would preserve the advantages of internal agency resolu-
tion of routine cases' 28 and de novo court review for large and com-
125. In its decisions during conciliation in disputed cases, the FEC should recognize
the First Amendment chilling effect of admittinga violation or defending a lawsuit. This
recommendation does not require the FEC to decide that portions of its statute are un-
constitutional, a power committed to courts rather than to agencies. See 3 K. DAVIS, supra
note 38, § 20.04, at 74 (1st ed. 1958). It calls for greater First Amendment sensitivity in
statutory interpretation, not for disregard of the statute.
In addition, conciliation agreements should include narrow, specific promises not to
engage in future violations rather than the broad, vague language frequently used in
past agreements. See notes 82 & 112 supra (FEC practice of requiring broadly worded
promises in conciliation agreements).
126. A modified FEC conciliation policy would not substantially reduce the opportuni-
ties for clarification of the statute, even if it reduced the number of enforcement suits. In
recent cases, district courts have dismissed FEC suits on the ground that the FEC has not
sufficiently defined the statute's requirements, but the courts have not undertaken such
interpretation themselves. See, e.g., FEC v. Committee for a Constitutional Presidency-
McCarthy '76, FED. ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANCING GUIDE (CCH) 9074 (D.D.C. March 7,
1979); FEC v. Citizens for the Republic, No. 78-1160 (D.D.C., defendant's motion for
summary judgment granted, March 1, 1979); OPEN POLITICS REPORT, March 1979, at 2-3
(published by Committee for a Constitutional Presidency, Washington, D.C.).
127. The procedure set forth in this Note fits neither of the traditional administrative
law categories: on the one hand, investigative and prosecutorial procedures that require
no safeguards because later court review is provided and, on the other hand, formal ad-
judicative proceedings requiring a full trial-type hearing. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TExT § 4.07 (3d ed. 1972) (though courts tend to refuse middle position between requiring
and not requiring trial-type hearing, less cumbersome procedural protection is desirable);
see p. 1206 supra.
128. The hybrid procedure does allow for the imposition of some penalties without
judicial determination or evidentiary hearing; this is constitutionally acceptable. The
major substantive provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act, as it now stands, have
been upheld by the Supreme Court. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). In a significant
1223
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 89: 1199, 1980
plex cases, 129 while providing additional safeguards for respondents
facing the FEC's de facto adjudication. 30 They would gTeatly reduce
the danger that administrative sanctions and restraints might penalize
or chill constitutionally protected political activity. They also would
reduce the procedural costs to all parties. Thus, they offer a workable
balance between the competing First Amendment requirements of
assuring accuracy and avoiding unnecessary burdens on respondents.
number of clear-cut cases, see note 41 supra, there will be no dispute about the Com-
mission's finding of a violation. In these cases, administrative sanctions do not create an
undue danger of erroneous determinaton, and they do avoid unnecessary costs for
respondents. In disputed small cases, internal agency resolution, with the safeguards sug-
gested in this Note, see pp. 1222-23 subra, is the "least drastic means" for enforcement
of the law against violators.
129. The procedure is not sufficiently elaborate to supersede de novo review in court
and thus to permit the less rigorous standard of "substantial evidence" review. See, e.g., 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). See generally K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 75-78 (6th ed. 1977)
(discussing "substantial evidence" standard). Thus, for those respondents with the incen-
tive and resources to defend themselves in litigation, the fact-finding will be made by
the court. See p. 1207 sukra (court's fact-finding capacity superior to FEC's).
130. Cf. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 7.00-13 (Supp. 1978) (im-
portance of developing new concept of "fair informal procedure" to be applied whenever
person's protected interest is threatened by agency decisionmaking; concept should be
more flexible than old concept of "fair trial").
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